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The Human Costs
of NAFTA
"There is as much injustice in
the equal treatment of unequal
cases as there is in the unequal
treatment of equal cases."
-Aristotle, in

by Melvin Burke

J'Xichomachean Ethics

T

he proposed North American Free Trade Agreement
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico is the
logical and perhaps inevitable extension of the 1989 Free
1fade Agreement between the United States and Canada.
Both agreements are controversial, and massive public opposi,
tion exists in all three countries-for good reasons, as we shall
see.
The citizens of these three nations have never been pro'
vided with a credible explanation of the need for NAFTA.
Contrary to the proclamations of NAFTA's proponents, there
are no guarantees that the supposed benefits of the free,trade
agreement will be realized, nor is it clear who will gain and
who will lose. The potentiallong,term economic benefits are
merely assumed to exceed the short,term adjustment costs,
so that everybody will eventually gain (the so,called "win,win"
scenario). How this will occur is a mystery, since there are
no provisions in the agreement for the potential winners to
compensate the potential losers. Once again, the dubious
mechanism of "trickle,down" is expected to do the job. Beyond
all this, it is debatable whether NAFTA will further free
trade at all. In fact, a strict interpretation of the economic
theory of free trade, classical or neoclassical, would indicate
otherwise.
NAFTA can be viewed as yet another official reaction to
a deepening global economic crisis, as well as an integral
part of the emerging "new world order." Despite widespread
democratic opposition, strategies like NAFTA are put on the
"fast track" and hurriedly implemented with support from
numerous officially sanctioned (and subsidized) reports, but
with no open discussion or debate and little time for scholarly
analysis or critique. Official domination of information appears
to be an essential part of the brave new world order that is
unfolding.
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Global Economic Crisis
and NAFTA

Statistics from international organi,
zations (the United Nations, the
World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, among
others) confirm that the global economy has been in a state
of crisis since the mid,1970s. The average annual global rate
of growth, approximately 5 percent in the years following World
War II, has fallen to less than half that amount in the last two
decades. Worse, zero growth has been recorded for the last
several years, and only more of the same is predicted for the
near future. No country or region of the world has been exempt
from this phenomenon-not the United States or Europe, not
Japan, not the Soviet Union, and certainly not Mexico or the
rest of Latin America.
Paradoxically, while everyone admits to an interdependent
global economy, each national or regional crisis is conveniently
treated as unique and unrelated. In this way, the impact that
, the policies of the industrialized countries have upon the rest
of the world are either ignored or denied. The facts, however,
do not support this position. The Latin American debt crisis
is a prime example: in 1979, Argentina's foreign debt was on'
ly $8 billion, Mexico's a manageable $29 billion, and Brazil's
$36 billion. In October 1979, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board
immoderately raised the real rate of interest (adjusted for
inflation). From an average ofless than one percent since 1973,
the rate speedily rose to more than 10 percent in 1981 and
16 percent in the first half of 1982. Compound these high in'
terest rates over time, factor in the global recession, and the
rest is history: Mexico's foreign debt today is over $100 billion
despite the Brady Plan, "debt equity swaps," rescheduling, and
other measures designed to reduce it.
This monetarist policy had the intended effect of reduc,
ing inflation in the United States. For the remainder of the
decade, a debt,financed recovery from the 1981-1982 reces,
sion was achieved with the help of capital flight (see glossary,
p. 5) and cheaper commodity imports from Latin America.
However, the cost to the United States of 1980s "prosperity"
was high and has yet to be paid. Government deficits sky,
rocketed, a $500 billion savings,and,loan crisis resulted, and
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enormous trade deficits changed the United States from a global
creditor to the world's largest debtor. Budget and trade deficits
averaging more than $200 billion a year eventually quadrupled
the US. national debt to $2 trillion. Meanwhile, family incomes
stagnated, income inequality worsened, and unemployment and
poverty increased.
In Mexico and the
other nations of Latin
America, these very
same factors-high interest rates, capital
flight, recession, and
low commodity prices
-combined to form a
vicious cycle of debt,
deficits, devaluations,
a~d negative growth
rates from which they
have yet to escape. By
1982, an estimated $93
billion, much of it
money controlled by
multinational corporations operating in Latin America, had
been moved from the region-$36 billion from Mexico alone.
Since then, total capital flight has risen to more than $400
billion, $50 billion of it from Mexico. Between 1981 and 1988,
total debt for the region increased by about 40 percent, and
the net transfer of capital (via interest payments) reached a
level of 4.1 percent of the gross domestic product per annum.
By way of comparison, the punitive net transfer of capital forced
upon Germany after World War I by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles was only 2.5 percent of the GDP.
Thus, high interest rates and capital flight-not failed
development policies or public (state-run) enterprises-were
responsible for the Mexican debt crisis of the 1980s. History
will also record that the "stabilization" and "structural-adjustment" programs imposed on Mexico by the International
Monetary Fund were disastrous "solutions" to both the debt
crisis and the larger dilemma of Latin American development.
The social legacies of the debt and of the IMF programs that
followed have been a more unequal distribution of income, increased unemployment, and greater absolute poverty. To cite
just one grim example: according to a United Nations FAO
report, an estimated 40 percent of the Mexican population was
suffering from malnutrition by 1983.
The contemporary global crisis and the failed economic
policies which contributed to it are the requisite background
for a comprehension of NAFTA. This trilateral free-trade
initiative is but the latest attempt to restore US. hegemony
in the global economy and a stability in the hemisphere that
is congenial to US. corporate interests. The overall strategy,
crafted by orthodox economists and implemented by conservative administrations, has been first to test economic policies
in the United States and then to impose them abroad as conditions for foreign loans. They have been able to do this by taking
advantage of the new "window of opportunity" presented by
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I .situatIOn
. . preval'Iing meXICO,
' M ' L'
t hd
e esperate economic
atm
America, and els~where in the world (a situation, ironically,
which they help9d to create).
These establi~hment economists loudly and repeatedly proclaim that all economic problems everywhere in the world have
a common cause! they are said to be the inevitableconsequences of deJiating from the private, free,market system
which alone gbarantees efficiency, stability, and growth.
Therefore, the~e economists argue, it is imperative that existing institution and policies be replaced with those found
in their model. Private enterprise, deregulation, and free
trade comprisel the ideological foundation of this structure.
Although it is rarely admitted, this neoclassical theory
is riddled withlrhetoric and disguised politics; it is also not
easily adapted to the complexities of the contemporary
global econom~. Consequently, this theory (and the policies
which it prescr"bes) often produces, in practice, unexpected,
paradoxical re ults.

, he Poverty of Theory
Many of us who have studied the economic theory of international trade-c~assical and neoclassical-come away impressed with its lbgical elegance but· skeptical of its practical
application. In thb most orthodox trade models, there is no
aCknOWledgement!at all of colonialism or imperialism, developed
and underdevelop d countries, technological differences, multinational corporations, or an International Monetary Fund. In
the classical Ridrdian model of trade, there are numerous
heroic assumptio~1s which defy credibility. Among these are
perfect competiti n, perfect knowledge, constant returns to
scale, full employ ent, and the absence of capital and labor
mobility in the "~wo-commodity, two-country" model. This
abstract and exq1isitely refined model logically proves that
increased speciali~ation and trade based upon comparative
advantage will potentially benefit both nations in the model
with increased e~iciency, production, and income. The free
movement of goo9s across borders compensates for the immobility of capital and labor, and only a situation of tariff-free
trade is needed. Bbcause it is assumed that nation-states enter
free trade volunta~ilY, they will either benefit or not trade. Yet,
employment and jncome distribution-two key determinants
of social welfarelare completely ignored in this paradigm. In
the later Heckscher-Ohlin neoclassical model of trade, it was
initially argued tHat social welfare would be maximized only
if the winners co+pensated the losers for all losses incurred.
This obstacle wa~ later surmounted with the introduction of
"community-indi erence curves"-a most dubious solution to
the problem. Pro hetically, the Heckscher-Ohlin model also
allowed the free iJternational movement of capital, but not of
labor.
.
Serious theor· tical problems arise when a more modern
trade model uses rbalistic assumptions, such as imperfect competition and incre1asing returns to scale. This contemporary,
dynamic, oligopolirtic model of trade, which made its appear-
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ance in the late 1970s, is called the "new international
economics." It demonstrates that, under the right circumstances, export subsidies and import restrictions (protectionism) can both increase trade and raise the welfare of
a nation-albeit often at the expense of other countries. The
"strategic trade policy" stemming from this fashionable
model requires that the government actively intervene in
international markets by creating, subsidizing, and protecting those national industries which have specific attributes-namely, increasing returns to scale, positive external
economies, advanced technology, and a high-income elasticity of demand. Such multinational corporate products as
electronics, automobiles, and petrochemicals all have these
particular characteristics. In this model, therefore, protectionist strategies are utilized to create comparative advantage,
which is not assumed to be given or "endowed" as in the
orthodox version.
This "new international economics" came into vogue
with the onset of the contemporary crisis and the phenomenal rise of Japan in the global economy. The die was
cast much earlier, however, when orthodox economists observed that, to a disturbing degree, empirical results contradicted their theoretical expectations. And so they abandoned their defense of these unrealistic assumptions (although not the assumptions themselves), substituting in its
place a new emphasis on "predictability." This evolution in
orthodoxy began with the doctrine of so-called positive
economics laid down in the 1930s by Nobel laureate Milton
Friedman, one of the most conservative economists in the
profession. In "The Methodology of Positive Economics,"
Friedman decreed that "theory is to be judged by its predictive power ... [and} cannot be tested by comparing its
assumptions directly with reality."
But there are two problems with Friedman's assertion:
not only are all neoclassical predictions still based upon
unrealistic assumptions, but economists in general (as
Friedman well knows) have a dislike for empirical investigation. As Nobel laureate economist Wassily Leontief, a
contemporary of Friedman, once tartly noted, "Nothing
reveals the aversion of the great majority of the presentday academic economists for systematic empirical inquiry
more than the methodological devices they employ to avoid
or cut short the use of concrete factual information."
Orthodox trade theory, as outlined above, is a static concept unrelated to economic development and based upon
unrealistic assumptions not verified by empirical studies. It
was developed and used by the dominant economic powers
of the time (England and the United States) and both reflected and served their global economic and political interests. However, every country in the process of industrializing has initially adopted "protectionist" export-promotion
strategies. Those which completed the process earlier
(England and the United States) then became advocates
of neoclassical free trade, which best served their own
economic interests. But those which industrialized later, such
as Germany and Japan, rejected neoclassical free-trade policy
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GLOSSARY OF ECONOMIC TERMS
capital flight - the immediate and massive exodus of corporate and personal financial capital from a country to escape inflation, devaluation
of the currency, and low profits domestically and to find security,
stability, and higher profits abroad. In essence, it is the means by which
corporate capital can "strike" to force policy changes upon a country.
comparative advantage - an abstract, static concept of orthodox economics which logically proves that, under the right conditions, each
nation can potentially become more efficient and gain the most by
specializing in and trading those goods which it produces most
efficiently (or least inefficiently) relative to others, depending on its
particular mix of land, labor, and capital. (This is often mistaken for
absolute advantage, a situation in which one nation produces what
another cannot.) Historically, this malleable concept has been
extensively used by the dominant industrialized countries to justify
exploitative trade relations with underdeveloped countries.
export-platform plants - multinational corporate production facilities
located in foreign (and domestic) cities and regions that produce goods
for export. These plants are highly subsidized by the government and
are exempt from most taxes and regulation. The Mexican maquiladores
are examples of such plants.
high income elasticity of demand - a characteristic of certain products
such that the demand for the product changes (increases or decreases)
by a greater percentage than changes in national income. Many luxury
goods fall into this category.
import substitution - a national policy of development which promotes
domestic production by taxing or otherwise limiting foreign imports and
by subsidizing domestic output. Many new or "infant" industries are
provided such protection until' such time that they grow, mature, and
can compete internationally.
oligopoly - the domination of an industry or market by only a few large
firms which have the power to fix output and prices and which often
engage in monopolistic practices. At the very least, these firms are
imperfectly competitive in theory and in practice.
perfect competition - an abstract and ideal industry and market structure
at the heart of neoclassical economics, which depicts production as
resulting from an infinite, independent number of small firms producing
homogeneous products so numerous that no one firm can fix or influence
prices, which are determined only by market supply and demand. (This
is Adam Smith's famous "invisible hand" which guarantees social benefit
from the individual pursuit of self-interest.)
positive external economies - benefits to an economy which result from
the production of an individual plant or firm. Included among these are
the creation oflinkages or related production, environmental improvement,
and technological advances. (There are also negative external economies:
pollution is the classic example.)
returns to scale - originally an engineering concept applied to the size of
production facilities, which explains how plants-when they are increased
in size-initially give rise to increased output and lower average costs,
then to constant output and costs, and, finally, to diminishing output
. and higher costs. Recently, this technical term has been extensively (and
improperly) used to justify monopolistic practices and large corporate
profits.
stabilization/structural adjustment - economic policies and programs forced
upon developing nations and former socialist countries as conditions
for receiving loans from the industrialized countries, the World Bank,
and the International Monetary Fund. They include the sale of public
assets, the lowering of wages, and austerity programs, and are pivotal
new agenda designed to reinstate the global economic order of yesteryear.

because they recognized that following this course would
destine them to be second-class powers forever.
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To comply with the dictates of free-trade policy, for
example, the Japanese government was encouraged to pursue
an internal laissez-faire policy, promote perfect competition, and
open the country to foreign investment. Instead, Japan chose
to develop its economy with national conglomerates (zaibatsus) which the government created, subsidized, and protected
through the Ministry
of International Trade
and Industry. After its
disastrous attempt to
become an imperialistic
colonial power prior to
1945, Japan pursued
export-promotion
strategies through
which it created comparative advantages in
steel, petrochemicals,
automobiles, and electronics. Thus, Japan
demonstrated
the
merits of doing precisely the opposite of what the Western world's leading neoclassical
economists advocated. In fact, the Japanese model so resembles
the "new international economics" that there can be little doubt
these revisionist economists learned from the Japanese experience. In essence, the "new international economics" is a
pragmatic response to Japan's challenge to U.S. hegemony in
the global economy.

NAFTA is actually a
retreat from global free
trade and is designed
to protect North
American markets from
further European and
Asian encroachment.

NAFTA: Free Trade or Protectionism?
What does this discussion of trade theory have to do with
NAFTA? The answer is: just about everything. The dominant
neoclassical paradigm has provided the intellectual rationale
and justification for NAFTA, as it has for all the other economic policies of the conservative governments of the United
States, Canada, and Mexico. Decision-makers and technocrats
in these three nations, educated and well-versed in this school
of economics, all agree that free trade is always preferable to
protectionism, that NAFTA is a free-trade tool, and that the .
agreement will improve competition, employment, and growth
rates in all three countries.
These assertions are truly incredible when we are mindful of the limitations of neoclassical trade theory, as well as
the aversion of orthodox economists to empirical investigation.
Only with a great deal of theoretical vulgarization can
NAFTA's advocates lay claim to such potential benefits. Technical terms-such as competition, efficiency, increasing returns
to scale, and comparative advantage-are not rigorously defined
by NAFTA advocates and are often grossly distorted by them
in order to make their promising predictions. In reality, neoclassical economic rhetoric serves as a smokescreen for the passage of NAFTA. No other paradigm can do the job half as
well; who, after all, can be opposed to an economic policy of
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freedom and free lrade which, at least theoretically and a priori,
guarantees such Ihappy results?
The hidden agenda behind NAFTA is not revealed in
orthodox trade theory or in official documents and proclamations but, rather! in the revisionist theory and policy objectives of the "n~w international economics." The theorists
of this school have not discarded free trade entirely; it
remains the idfal, although supplemented by a sophisticated
interventionisF with all its limitations and dangers. And
when one loo~ at the actual situation, it is difficult to argue
that free tradf can be the primary objective of NAFTA,
since trade betlween the three signatory nations has already
been virtually ~eed of protection. Mexico, Canada, and the
United States he all members ofGATI (the General Agreement on Tra& and Tariffs). Canada and Mexico are the
United State~' first- and third-largest trading partners,
respectively. ~exico's average tariff is only 10 percent, while
Canadian andl U.S. tariffs average about 4 percent. Moreover, these averages do not include the free trade which
exists betweenl Mexico and the United States in maquiladore
production anti between Canada and the United States in
automobiles. ~o significant barriers to foreign investment
or plant transfer~ have existed between the three countries
since Mexico entered GATT in 1986 and President Salinas
revised his countrr's investment laws shortly after assuming
office in 1988. Slbuld these "reforms" continue, and should
special agreementl between the three countries remove the few
remaining barrierk to trade and capital movements, then we
will have a de factb NAFTA in the absence of one de jure. One
should therefore ~uestion the need for a free-trade agreement
at all.
I
Nor are competitive markets an authentic goal of NAFTA.
The orthodox th~oretical model of price competition, engaged
in by a large number of small firms which do not advertise or
restrict output, iJ not the type of rivalry practiced by multinational corporatibns. Oligopolistic multinationals today dominate the economi~s of all three NAFTA countries. IfNAFTA
accomplishes anthing, it will be to increase the mobility,
market share, anCl profitability of these large firms at the
expense of smallernd more competitive national ones. The expansion and stren¥,hening of massive North American multinationals is one of t~e major objectives ofNAFTA, and increased
intercorporate trage is what NAFTA will most likely give rise
to. As such, the ~greement is designed to achieve the policy
goals of the "nejw international economics" and not those of
neoclassical free rade.
.

The Hid en Political and Economic
Objectives of NAFTA
I
NAFTA is, therefore, actually a retreat from global free trade. '
It will create an ~merican trade bloc designed to accomplish
two objectives: fdrst, protect North American continental
markets from furtHer European and Asian encroachment in the
short run; and sJcond, enhance the global competitiveness
I
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-and power of American multinational corporations in the long
run. NAFTA is but the latest measure taken to retore the status
quo ante (the international order circa 1890 to 1925) and US.
global hegemony. NAFTA joins a number of similar maneuvers
in the recent past designed to further this strategy, including
the elimination of international commodity agreements; the
termination of the Generalized System of Tariffs; and the eradi, _
cation of the Third World development model, which was
founded upon import substitution, infant industry protection,
and public enterprises.
Politically, NAFTA will consolidate in a single international
treaty the profoundly reactionary economic achievements of
the 1980s in all three countries before their conservative gov,
ernments exit from power. Including Mexico in this trilateral
extension of the earlier Free Trade Agreement between the
United States and Canada can be viewed as a reward for the
Mexican government's support of the Brady Plan, as well as
compliance with the IMF's conditional,loan programs and the
implementation of so'called economic reforms. Beyond this,
NAFTA reflects the extraordinary power of multinational cor'
porations (predominantly from the United States) to set na'
tional and international policy in all three countries. NAFTA
also has the hidden objectives of stemming the flow of illegal
immigration from Mexico to the United States and perpetuating
Mexico's brutal one'party "democracy."
Economically, NAFTA is designed to enhance and protect
the power of American multinationals and their exploitation
of old and new markets on the continent. US. corporations
will undoubtedly increase their domination over this expand,
ed market once NAFTA is signed. Their franchises can be ex,
pected to expand into Canada as well as Mexico, and more
manufacturing plants will be shifted from the north to the
south. Export'platform plants in Asia and in Central and South
America will also be moved into this free'trade zone (ai,
though not to the United States) to take advantage of,
among other things, lower transportation costs.

Potential Costs and Benefits of NAFTA
These trends are already evident, even before ratification
of the agreement, and they are but the first of the struc'
tural changes that will be induced by NAFTA. In 1990,
for example, there were only 10 foreign franchises operating
in Mexico. With changes in Mexican investment laws, the
number of foreign franchises increased to 125 by 1992, with
950 outlets throughout the country. Over the last five years,
US. manufacturers have invested $11.6 billion in Mexican
plants; more than 250,000 cars assembled in Mexico (or
about 85 percent) have been exported back to the United
States. The number of Mexican small businesses and US.
workers replaced by these capital movements are among the
social costs which have been conveniently ignored in the typical
discussions of NAFTA.
Because of the mar~ed wage disparity betweeen Mexico,
on the one hand, and the United States and Canada, on the
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other, corporations can realize significant cost reductions by
moving their capital and plants to the south. Hourly manufac'
turing wages in the United States and Canada average about
$15, as compared with $2 in Mexico. The multinational cor'
porate strategy, therefore, is to increase profits through lower
wage costs, fixed prices, and increased market shares-not
through product innovation, technological advances, or
economies of scale in production.
Those who claim that wages will be equalized or that the
price of commodities traded in the region will be reduced any
time soon are in for a few surprises. Such scenarios, derived
from neoclassical trade models, defy credibility in the oligo,
polistic world in which we live and would void the coveted
benefits and corporate profits of NAFTA. It is not likely that
the anticipated movement of capital and jobs to Mexico will
significantly increase wages due to that country's huge number
of unemployed and underemployed laborers. The border rna'
quiladores, which employ about 500,000 Mexican workers,
already pay less than the average manufacturing wage in Mexico
(and in Asia). These multinational corporate assembly plants
currently pay money wages as low as 57 cents an hour and
total wages-including benefits-of about $1.15.
If the rnaquiladores are the vanguard of what NAFTA will
bring, they do not portend well for the workers of Mexico,
Canada, or the United States. This transfer of manufacturing
and other production facilities to Mexico will weaken labor
unions in the United States and Canada and have a depress'
ing effect upon real wages-not enough to discourage illegal
immigration from Mexico to the United States but enough to
increase the profits of American corporations. Moreover, the
mere threat of transferring plants to Mexico has already ob,
tained wage concessions from workers in the United States
and Canada. And while the number of abysmally paid Mexican
workers employed by
US. corporations has
increased, employment
by these very same
firms in the United
States and Canada has
decreased-as have
real wages in both
countries. Canada, for
example, lost more
than 300,000 jobs-13
percent of its total
manufacturing employ,
ment-since the Free
Trade Agreement was
signed; this occurred
despite the fact that US. corporations doubled their invest'
ments in Canada between 1986 and 1990, from about $50
billion to over $100 billion. The recently released International
1fade Commission's report on the potential impacts ofNAFTA
showed job loss in the United States as "low" as 145,000 by
1995 and as high as 490,000 by the year 2000. The net in'
crease in US. jobs after NAFTA (based upon rather optimistic

NAFTA reflects the
extraordinary power
of multinational
corporations to set
national and
international policy in
all three countries.
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growth, investment, and trade assumptions) was estimated to
be as low as 0.03 percent of the labor force, or only 35,000
jobs by 1995.
For Mexico, NAFTA is an opportunity to attract to its
economy the private capital which fled the country during the
1980s; to compensate for the reduced public loans which have
been diverted to East'
ern European coun,
tries by the IMF; and
to join an exclusive,
powerful trade bloc in
the hemisphere. The
NAFTA-like "pro'mar'
ket" reforms of the
Salinas administration
already have lured bil,
lions of dollars back to
Mexico. Since 1989,
the Mexican stock ex,
change has increased
sevenfold; this expan'
sion was fueled by the
"privatization" (sale) of public enterprises such as TELMEX,
the national telecommunications system. Mexico will pay at
least part of its massive foreign debt by selling such public assets
to private businesses. For example, the Mexican government
sold TELMEX for $3.7 billion and exchanged that money for
$7.2 billion of discounted Mexican debt. Privatized TELMEX
now has a stock value of $28 billion-but the phones in the
country do not operate any more efficiently, and neither real
investment nor employment has been increased by this specula'
tive activity. PEMEX, the national petroleum irldustry, is soon
to suffer the same fate: already the retail gas stations have been
privatized, and 50,000 workers-about 25 percent ofPEMEX's
labor force-have been laid off over the last three years.
What does this tell us about investment and free'trade
agreements? First, that speculative investment may be attracted
by a nation without an agreement, giving rise to no increase
in production or employment, as in the case of Mexico and
its recent stock-market boom. Second, that real investment may
be attracted and give rise to increased employment but not to
increased real wages, again without a trade agreement, as has
also occurred in Mexico. Third, that a free'trade agreement
may give rise to increased investment but also' to decreased
employment and wages, as in Canada. Finally, that a free'trade
agreement may result in decreased investment; employment, and
wages, as in the United States.
What does this tell us about NAFTA? It is abundantly
clear that NAFTA will give rise to a major redistribution of
income and wealth-not so much from country to country as
from one socioeconomic class to another. More specifically,
NAFTA will undoubtedly redistribute income from wage and
salaried workers to the propertied elite in Mexico, Canada,
and the United States. We know this already from the recent
experience of Mexico with its corporate maquiladores and
investment "reforms," and from the effects of the Free Trade

NAFTA could give rise
to a trade war among
the world's three
emerging blocs: North
America, the European
Economic Community,
and the Asian bloc.
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Agreement betwln the United States and Canada. This alone
would constitute I a success for the architects of NAFTA. In
the final analysis, ~t is not countries or corporations but, rather,
the propertied elfte in all three nations who are the driving
force behind thiS agreement-and who will be NAFTA's
ultimate and perhaps only beneficiaries.
The long,tierm economic objective ofNAFTA, also ob,
scured, is to iJcrease the bargaining position and strength
of American f,lUltinational corporations vis'a,vis Europe
(Germany) an? Asia Gapan). Failures in the bilateral trade
talks withJap~n over the past couple of years, and the more
recent collapsr of GATT negotiations with the European
community~. Brussels, have left the American multi,
nationals with few other trade options. The trade,diverting
effects of N TA will be profound and will affect not only
Japan and the European Community but also the develop,
ing countries f Asia and Latin America.
. In the ablnce of retaliation from Europe and Asia,
NAFTA does have the potential for improving the profita,
bility and glob I market share of North American corpora,
tions. NAFT1' however, could also give rise to a trade war
among the world's three emerging blocs: North America,
the European Eronomic Community, and the Asian bloc
centered on Japan. According to Paul Krugman, one of the
founders of the 'jnew international economics," a trade war
would not be the risaster that orthodox trade theorists claim:
And let's sURPose that each of these trading blocs
becomes highly protectionist, imposing a tariff against
goods from outside the bloc of 100 percent, which we
suppose leads I to a fall in imports of 50 percent ....
A trade war 1hat cut international trade in half, and
which caused ~ average cost of wasted resources for the
displaced prod~ction of, say, 50 percent, would therefore
cost the worlCl economy only 2.5 percent of its in'
come.... (It if roughly the cost of a 1 percent increase
in the unemplrment rate.)
To avoid this~npleasant scenario, which would have nega'
tive political as ell as economic repercussions and perhaps
lead to a global c nflict, NAFTA could first be expanded to
include all nationJ in the hemisphere-that is, a Pan,American
Free Trade Agreetnent. NAFTA's provisions differ from those
of the European Etonomic Community and GATT in a number
of significant wayJ, and the agreement could conceivably serve
I
as a useful new ~lOdel for global free trade. However, these
outcomes are not ~ediately obtainable, and they are certainly
not the objective~ of the new "strategic trade policy" being
pursued by the ch[ef executive officers of the American multi,
nationals.

The, "lose-lose" Scenario
In conclusion, it is extremely difficult to quantitatively estimate
the impact of NtFTA upon the economies of the United
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States, Canada, and Mexico should it be ratified and imple,
mented. A priori calculations of increased trade, employment,
and income are little more than educated guesses founded upon
questionable assumptions. Also, the negative aspects of
NAFTA are grossly underestimated and often ignored. To
disregard them gives only a biased and exaggerated appraisal
ofNAFTA's potential benefits. The unintended outcome could
be less for everyone (the little,mentioned "lose,lose" scenario)
if aggregate demand decreases, if the global crisis worsens, if
a trade war erupts, or if Mexico does not develop.
Unless Mexico is granted special concessions to protect
and develop its economy, another paradoxical result of NAFTA
will be the "development of underdevelopment." Both the
progressive economic paradigm and the "new international
economics," as well as the historic example of Japan, argue
against Mexico pursuing a NAFTA-type strategy of foreign
investment, deregulation, and free trade. By international
treaty, NAFTA will preclude Mexico from undertaking indus,
trial planning, infant industry protection, land reform, and
income redistribution, while increasing dependency and the
domination of the Mexican economy by foreign multinational
corporations. Cultural preservation and sustainable agriculture
will also cease to be options for Mexico after NAFTA is signed.
Most adversely affected will be the ejidos (small farms),
the beneficiaries of the Mexican revolution. Agribusiness will
replace them, imported corn will be substituted for domestic
production, and, in the process, these small landowners will
be pushed off the land and forced to become itinerant laborersunwelcome either in Mexican cities or across the border in the
United States.
The orthodox trade'theory concept of comparative advan'
tage ignores stages of development in nations and directs under,
developed countries to specialize in the production and export
of their raw materials to industrialized nations. As such,
Mexico's peripheral status in the new world order will be set
in concrete by NAFTA. The U.S.-Mexican border will con'

tinue to divide an underdeveloped country from a developed
one. For poor Mexican laborers, this border will still bar them
from a better life, and illegal immigration to the United States
will continue. For American multinational corporations and
those who own them, however, even this (already minimal)
obstruction to income and wealth accumulation will be
eliminated.
/Neither NAFTA nor neo,liberal "market reforms;' nor suc,
cess in future GATT negotiations, will be the panacea for the
global economic crisis that their proponents claim. If success
at GATT raises global income by the estimated $100 billion
annually, and NAFTA by just a fraction of that amount-about
$20 billion, distributed unequally among nations and socio'
economic classes-the suspicion arises that NAFTA is not
really concerned with furthering free trade, efficiency, or
growth. NAFTA is, in fact, little more than the latest strategy
of orthodox economists and conservative politicians to re'
distribute income and wealth from the many to the few and
from the poorest to the richest countries and classes.
The rhetoric and disguised politics of orthodox neoclassical
economics, a vulgarization of the theory, and an unsatisfac,
tory, somewhat dishonest fabrication of statistics have been
combined to convince the public that everyone will win with
NAFTA. But if the past is any guide to the future, some will
win, some will lose, and the winners will not compensate the
losers. This is already the legacy of monetarist high,interest
rates, privatization, deregulation, stabilization, and structural
adjustment. There is every reason to expect that NAFTA will
:~;
yield more of the same.

Melvin Bur~e is a professor of economics at the University of
Maine. He is also the head of Practical Progressive Consultants,
Inc. An earlier, expanded version of this article was presented at
the international symposium "Beyond N.AFTA: Financial Inte,
gration and Development," held at the Universidad N.acional
Autonoma de Mexico in Mexico City on January 20-22, 1993.
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LAST CHANCE TO REGISTER 'FOR THE 1993 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE

Humanist Society of Friends and Division of Humanist Counseling
SEPTEMBER 17-19, 1993 • Harborside Hyatt at Logan Airport, Boston, MA
featuring special sessions for professional Humanist Counselors. as well as joint ~anquet programs
on Rational Recovery with Albert Ellis. David Burns. and others.
•
•

Full registration with meals (Friday evening through Sunday morning) is $145 per person.
Saturday registration with no meals (no luncheon or luncheon program) is $65 per person.

Lodging at the Harborside Hyatt is $99 per night (plus room taxes). To reserve your room, call (617) 568-1234 and ask for the
reservations office; be sure to mention "Rational Recovery" to get this special lodging rate.
For complete details and to register for the conference, write or call: The Humanist Society of Friends, 7 Harwood Drive.
P.O. Box 1188, Amherst, NY 14226-7188; (800) 743-6646.

SEPTEMBER/OcmBER 1993

9

